Monticello Live

Daniel Pedraza, who received a life sentence from the Drew County Circuit Court jury appealed the life sentence of life sentence rendered in a jury-sentencing proceeding that followed his guilty plea to murder in the first degree of his 2 year old step-daughter.

As his sole point for reversal, Pedraza contends that the circuit court erred in refusing to permit additional voir dire (questioning and interviews) of the selected but unsworn jury after the plea agreement had been consummated.

Appellant was charged by amended information with the February 2012 capital murder of his two-year-old stepdaughter, Aubriana Coke. The State filed notice of the aggravating circumstances it would rely on in seeking the death penalty; namely, that the murder was committed against a person less than twelve years of age and in an especially cruel and depraved manner that brought Appellant pleasure.

Jury selection for Appellant’s trial began on Thursday, May 30, 2013. The circuit
court placed strict time constraints and other restrictions on voir dire, and a jury was selected for this then capital-murder case in one day. On Friday morning, May 31, 2013, although the circuit court had excused the venire, the circuit court did not swear the jury because counsel for both sides had informed the court that they were in the process of plea negotiations. The circuit court, accordingly, granted a recess until Monday and instructed the selected but unsworn jury to return at that time.

Over the weekend both sides did, in fact, reach a plea agreement. The State agreed to waive the death penalty and reduce the charge to first-degree murder, while Appellant agreed to plead guilty to first-degree murder and be sentenced by the jury. Appellant appeared in court on Saturday, June 1, 2013, and the circuit court accepted his guilty plea.

On Monday, June 3, 2013, the State filed a second amended information charging Appellant with first-degree murder. As part of the plea bargain, Appellant agreed to waive any and all errors that had occurred up to that time. Thus, also on June 3, 2013, Appellant filed a written statement of waiver stating that
having elected to accept the State’s offer to plead guilty to the charge of first degree murder following jury selection on May 31, 2013, for a trial on the charge of capital murder, [he] hereby waives and relinquishes appellate review as to all objections, motions, and other issues decided adversely to him prior to his guilty plea, reserving, however, the right of appeal as to any error which may occur in his jury sentencing for the offense of first degree murder.
When the selected, but not yet sworn, jury appeared on Monday morning, Appellant sought to ask or to have the circuit court ask the jurors, additional questions concerning the change in circumstances that had occurred over the weekend. The circuit court denied the
request, and the sentencing trial began. After the jury had heard evidence and argument over two days, the jury sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment. This appeal followed.

the record makes clear that the circuit court’s acceptance of the plea agreement was conditioned upon Pedraza’s agreement that the seated jury would sentence him.
Additionally, Pedraza has not shown that any juror was prejudiced against him by his guilty plea. We will not presume prejudice where an error is alleged. Hickman v. State, 372 Ark. 438, 277 S.W.3d 217 (2008). An appellant must present specific facts to show prejudice because we will not reverse for harmless error. Id. Indeed, if Pedraza’s true concern was that the jury was not qualified to sentence him on the reduced charge of first-degree murder, the only relief available to him would have been to request that the circuit court allow him to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial on the original charge of capital murder. Instead,Pedraza sought to keep the benefit of the plea agreement while rejecting the condition upon
which the agreement was made.
Because Pedraza appeals from an issue that was a condition integral to the circuit
court’s acceptance of the plea agreement, we do not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal and it should be dismissed.

This entry was posted on Friday, June 27th, 2014 at 2:23 pm and is filed under Site. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.